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Argument 
Dr. James Hansen’s 1988 testimony before the U.S. Senate was an important turning point 
in the history of global climate change. However, no studies have explained why Hansen’s 
scientiﬁc communication in this deliberative setting was more successful than his testimonies 
of 1986 and 1987. This article turns to Hansen as an important case study in the rhetoric of 
accommodated science, illustrating how Hansen successfully accommodated his rhetoric to his 
non-scientist audience given his historical conditions and rhetorical constraints. This article (1) 
provides a richer explanation for the rhetorical/political emergence of global warming as an 
important public policy issue in the United States during the late 1980s and (2) contributes to 
scholarly understanding of the rhetoric of accommodated science in deliberative settings, an 
often overlooked area of science communication research. 
Standing on the promontory of the rocky rims in Billings, Montana, there is usually 
a distinct horizontal line between the clear, blue sky and the white, snowcapped 
Beartooth Mountains. But the summer of 1988 was different. A fuzzy, reddish tint 
lingered across the once pristine skyline of “Big Sky Country.” The reason: More 
than one hundred miles to the south, Yellowstone National Park smoldered in one of 
the most devastating forest ﬁres of the twentieth century (Anon. 1988, A18; Stevens 
1999, 129–130). But that was not the only thing about 1988 that was extraordinary: 
New York and Washington D.C. consistently saw the mercury rise to more than 100 
degrees Fahrenheit, America’s breadbasket experienced droughts reminiscent of the 
1930s Dust Bowl, and the water level of the mighty Mississippi River sank to an 
all-time low. Across the United States it seemed that there were ominous warnings of 
accelerated global climate change. 
In June of the same year, members of the U.S. Senate’s Committee on Energy and 
Natural Resources gathered in a meeting that would thrust global climate change into 
the public spotlight. According to the committee’s chair, Senator Timothy E. Wirth 
(D-CO), the purpose of the committee meeting was to “ﬁgure out how to deal with 
this emergency” (U.S. Congress 1988, 1). In his opening statement, Wirth recognized 
the importance of climate change for public policy: “In the last week many of us have 
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been seeing ﬁrsthand the effects of the drought that is occurring across the heart of the 
country” and “as drought conditions have clearly demonstrated, those considerations 
stretch across the public policy spectrum” (ibid., 5). The committee’s Senators were 
well aware of the weather conditions. Senator Kent Conrad (D-ND) said the land 
in his state looked like a “moonscape” because of the drought (ibid., 31). Senator 
Dale Bumpers (D-AR) put the scorching heat of the year, and the entire decade, into 
perspective: “And now we know that the four warmest years in the last 130 years – the 
four hottest years of the last 130 years – have occurred since 1980” (ibid., 38). However, 
the unusual weather was not the only reason 1988 was to be remembered. For the 
ﬁrst time, global climate change became a signiﬁcant public and policy concern in the 
United States. In previous decades climate change was only occasionally mentioned 
outside of scientiﬁc circles, but in the late 1980 s, the public and policymakers emerged 
from the periphery to positions of prominence in global climate change discussions in 
part because of the public advocacy of a then little-known scientist. 
Although many climate scientists testiﬁed before Congress in the late 1980s, taking 
advantage of the opportune climate conditions of the time, many observed how 
the Congressional testimony of Dr. James Hansen, a climatologist and computer 
modeler working at the National Aeronautic and Space Administration’s (NASA) 
Goddard Institute for Space Studies, received signiﬁcantly more notice than others 
(Schneider 1990, 195; Wilford 1988, 4; Pomerance 1989, 262–268; Ungar 1992, 491– 
493). Hansen’s 1988 testimony effectively garnered the attention of journalists and 
political elites. During his testimony before the Senate committee on June 23, Hansen 
announced to the mediated world “with 99 percent conﬁdence” that global warming 
was a real phenomenon (U.S. Congress 1988, 39). Following Hansen’s testimony, Dr. 
Michael Oppenheimer of the Environmental Defense Fund marveled: “I’ve never seen 
an environmental issue mature so quickly, shifting from science to the policy realm 
almost overnight” (Wilford 1988, 4). Although some scientists were skeptical of his 
conviction, viewing his claims to be unjustiﬁed based on his data, to environmentalists 
“Hansen became an instant hero” (Stevens 1999, 133). Historian of science Spencer 
Weart argued that evidence of Hansen’s inﬂuence has been captured in public opinion 
polls: In a 1981 poll, when asked whether or not they had heard or read about the 
greenhouse effect, only 38 per cent of respondents said they had. In a 1989 poll, 
just after James Hansen helped to thrust climate change into the public spotlight, 79 
per cent of respondents indicated they had heard or read about the greenhouse effect 
(Weart 2003, 156). Over time, Hansen’s testimony became an important touchstone 
for debate as recent scholarly treatments of global climate change history have observed 
(Christianson 1999, 199; Weart 2003, 156). 
Saying Hansen’s scientiﬁc communication was successful in garnering public 
attention is relatively uncontroversial; however, attempts to explain why have not 
yet emerged in scholarly treatments of global climate change. I contend Hansen’s 
1988 success is rooted in his gradual development of a rhetorical sensitivity to his 
non-scientist audiences: journalists, policymakers, and the general public. In other 
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words, Hansen learned to engage in what rhetorical scholars call the rhetoric of 
“accommodating science” (Fahnestock 1998; Groenewegen 2002; Pellechia 1997). By 
comparing Hansen’s 1986 and 1987 Congressional testimonies with his more effective 
1988 testimony, I show how Hansen accommodated his message to adapt his research 
to non-scientiﬁc audiences given the rhetorical constraints and conditions of the time. 
Investigating James Hansen’s rhetoric of the late 1980s is warranted not just because 
he plays an important role in the history of global climate change science dissemination 
to wider audiences. Hansen’s rhetoric also deserves our attention because his case can 
inform scholarly understanding of the rhetoric of accommodating science, rhetoric 
aimed at adapting scientiﬁc knowledge and information to situated, non-scientiﬁc 
audiences. Jeanne Fahnestock noted in her classic treatment of accommodating science 
why additional scholarly work in this area of rhetorical theory is needed: “The way 
information changes as a function of rhetorical situation certainly deserves scholarly 
scrutiny beyond this preliminary study, for at issue is the machinery and quality of social 
decision making in an expert-dominated age” (Fahnestock 1998, 346). However, as 
we will soon discover, the literature on accommodating rhetoric is heavily slanted 
in favor of examining forensic and epideictic rhetoric while overlooking the role of 
accommodated rhetoric in deliberative settings. 
The remainder of this article is divided into three sections. In the ﬁrst section I 
review the rhetoric of accommodating science literature. The second section situates 
Hansen’s testimonials and expertise in the context of late 1980 s climate science. Third, 
I examine key rhetorical changes Hansen made between his less successful 1986 and 
1987 and his more successful 1988 testimonies; here I discuss both Hansen’s written 
and spoken works in relation to their speciﬁc contexts and constraints. As we shall 
see, Hansen’s 1988 success and the rhetorical/political emergence of global warming 
in U.S. discourse is rooted in Hansen’s gradual development of a rhetorical sensitivity 
to historical conditions, rhetorical constraints, and non-scientist audiences. 
The Rhetoric of Accommodating Science 
Science rhetoric accommodated to a non-scientiﬁc audience is more than “simply a 
matter of translating technical jargon into non-technical equivalents” (ibid., 335). The 
act of accommodation involves audience adaptation as information moves from the 
technical sphere of science into public circulation. In addition, accommodated science 
also takes into account changes in rhetorical situations. Based on an analysis of articles 
in the journal Science and its accommodated counterparts, Fahnestock makes a number 
of observations about accommodated science. For my purposes here, I wish to focus 
on two of Fahnestock’s observations about accommodation rhetoric that make it more 
than an issue of translation. First, Fahnestock notes that there is a “genre shift that 
occurs between the original presentation of a scientist’s work and its popularization.” 
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Second, there is also a change in “statement types” that increases the level of certainty 
in accommodated science (ibid., 332). 
Fahnestock uses Aristotle to explain what she means by a “genre shift” in accom­
modated science. According to Aristotle, rhetoric can be divided into three different 
classiﬁcations or genres: forensic, deliberative, and epideictic. Forensic rhetoric is con­
cerned with the nature and cause of past events and is typically used in legal venues such 
as courts. Deliberative rhetoric focuses on debating the best possible future action and is 
usually used in political settings such as a legislature. Finally, epideictic rhetoric concerns 
the judgment of praise or blame and is often used in ceremonial settings such as awards 
banquets and funerals. For Fahenstock, “a case can be made for classifying original sci­
entiﬁc reports as forensic discourse,” a kind of discourse concerned with establishing the 
nature and cause of past events, the events being experiments and observations. Accom­
modations of science rhetoric, however, are “overwhelmingly epideictic; their main 
purpose is to celebrate rather than validate.” The implications of such a shift involve 
a change in the nature of the content being communicated. When science rhetoric 
moves from the forensic genre to the epideictic, rhetors “must usually be explicit in 
their claims about the value of the scientiﬁc discoveries they pass along. They cannot 
rely on the audience to recognize the signiﬁcance of information” (ibid., 333–334). 
The second general observation Fahnestock makes about accommodated rhetoric 
has to do with the taxonomy of “statement types” in the creation of certainty. 
Borrowing from Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar’s canonical science studies work 
Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientiﬁc Facts, Fahnestock argues that accommodated 
science rhetoric uses statement types different from the original, unaccommodated 
science discourse. Thus, there is a signiﬁcant change in content. According to Latour 
and Woolgar, there are ﬁve basic statement types that are used in the production of 
scientiﬁc papers. These statement types differ based on the amount of uncertainty 
expressed by the rhetor. A type ﬁve statement “corresponds to a taken-for-granted 
fact,” thus having the highest degree of certainty (Latour and Woolgar 1986, 76). 
These statements are often free of references and seem self-evident to audiences. A 
type four statement is less certain than a type ﬁve statement. The claim being advanced 
is often uncontroversial, but it is stated in such a way that the claim is made explicit. Type 
three and two statements introduce uncertainties into the rhetoric because they contain 
“hedges, qualiﬁcations, or ‘modalities’ that suggest the information is not indisputable” 
(Fahnestock 1998, 343; Latour and Woolgar 1986, 77). A type three statement contains 
subtle elements that could decrease the level of certainty one has in a rhetor’s claims. 
For example, a type three statement might contain a citation, a rhetorical feature that 
suggests the claim needed evidentiary support. A type two claim contains qualiﬁcations 
that are much stronger. For example, wording that suggests something “may,” “might,” 
or “could be” true would detract from a statement’s level of certainty. Finally, a type 
one statement is uncertain, speculative, and openly insufﬁcient. 
Based on Latour and Woolgar’s taxonomy, Fahnestock concludes that 
accommodated science rhetoric “trafﬁcs in statements of type 5 and 4, the exposed 
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certainties, and of type 1, the weakly supported and speculative” (Fahnestock 1998, 
334). In accommodated rhetoric, space and time constraints often leave “no room for 
the qualiﬁcations a more knowledgeable audience would demand, qualiﬁcations that 
show the author’s awareness of the criticism and refutation that an expert audience 
could raise” (ibid., 338). Thus, without fear of being challenged by non-scientiﬁc 
audiences, authors of accommodated rhetoric appear more certain because modalities 
and hedges have been eliminated. In addition, accommodated rhetoric has the tendency 
to “replace the signs or data of an original research report with the effects or results.” 
In other words, questions of method and observational practice become secondary to 
the scientiﬁc discovery. This emphasis on the product of science, and not the process, 
allows rhetors to increase “the signiﬁcance and certainty of their subject matter” (ibid.). 
When audiences are unaware of uncertainties in scientiﬁc methodology, the conclusion 
appears more certain than it may actually be. 
Scholars concerned with the roles of hedging and scientiﬁc uncertainty in technical 
and popular discourse concur with a number of Fahnestock’s observations. Most 
hedging scholars agree that “hedging is the accepted practice in the scientiﬁc 
community” (Horn 2001, 1087). According to Hyland, scientists’ attempts to qualify 
their claims through rhetorical devices such as hedging are “crucial to the procedures of 
argumentation and claim acceptance, playing a critical role in both the social ratiﬁcation 
of knowledge and the system of professional rewards and recognition that emanate from 
publication” (Hyland 1996, 278). By qualifying one’s arguments, scientists engage in 
the paradoxical practice of weakening their claims rather than actually strengthening 
them for a particular audience. 
Despite their heavy use in scientiﬁc texts written for scientiﬁc audiences, scholars 
have also observed that qualiﬁers, hedges, and modalities are often omitted as the 
arguments are accommodated for the general public. According to an early study 
by James Tankard Jr. and Michael Ryan (1974), scientists felt journalists often left 
out relevant information about methodology (over 35 per cent of the time) and 
qualiﬁcations (over 31 per cent of the time). Eleanor Singer’s study likewise found that 
journalists had “omitted some qualifying statements” in 60 per cent of their stories 
and “consistently omitted discussion of the research methods” (Singer 1990, 109–110). 
It seems clear that when journalists accommodate scientiﬁc rhetoric for the general 
public, key rhetorical features, such as “contextual factors and methodological details, 
are still frequently omitted” (Pellechia 1997, 61). 
Although content analyses have veriﬁed that accommodated rhetoric contains fewer 
caveats and qualiﬁers than the original scientiﬁc texts, other studies have examined what 
effect these uncertainty-adjusting devices have on audience reception of messages. 
Early writing texts and studies on the effects of hedging suggest hedging should be 
avoided at all costs, calling these rhetorical devices “weakeners,” “downtoners,” and 
“understatements” (Crismore and Vade Kopple 1988, 184–185). Early sociological 
treatments often assumed these uncertainty devices harmed a scientist’s credibility 
and detracted from “the public image of science” (Zehr 1999, 9). In other words, 
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the presence of uncertainty in one’s arguments is a kind of “powerless” language 
(Jensen 2008, 348). However, recent research has reversed this trend. Examining student 
learning, Avon Crismore and William Vande Kopple found that “subjects who made 
the greatest learning gains were not the control subjects, those who read passages 
without hedges. Rather, they were those who read passages with hedges” (Crismore 
and Kopple 1988, 198). Jakob Jensen (2008), in his study on news coverage about cancer 
research, found that articles with caveats, limitations, and hedges actually enhanced 
perceptions of trustworthiness for both the journalists writing the story and the scientists 
who were addressing the uncertainties. Ultimately, many scholars have concluded that 
the appropriateness and effectiveness of hedges, qualiﬁcations, and caveats is a matter of 
context, purpose, and audience (Crismore and Vande Kopple 1990, 57; Jensen 2008, 
362). 
When turning to the accommodated science literature, a great deal has been 
discovered. Scholars have determined that texts written primarily for scientists by 
other scientists are more likely to have what Latour and Woolgar would call type 
two and three statements, statements that are heavily hedged or qualiﬁed. There 
is also ample evidence to suggest accommodated rhetoric written by journalists is 
not heavily hedged, using what Latour and Woolgar would call type four and ﬁve 
statements. These observations mesh nicely with Fahnestock’s observations about the 
nature of accommodated rhetoric. However, returning to Fahnestock’s claims also 
allows us to observe areas in the literature that have not yet been fully addressed. If 
non-accommodated scientiﬁc texts (i.e., journal articles) can be argued to ﬁt into a 
forensic genre and accommodated scientiﬁc texts (i.e., news stories) are said to ﬁt into 
an epideictic genre, what have scholars discovered about accommodated rhetoric in 
deliberative settings? Unfortunately, the answer to this question is “very little.” If the 
use of hedging depends so heavily on context, purpose, and audience, not discussing 
the use of accommodated rhetoric in deliberative settings (i.e., scientists testifying 
before Congress) remains a glaring scholarly omission. Does hedging in deliberative 
settings (where policymakers are concerned with making a decision about future action) 
function the same way as hedging does in the learning scenarios observed by Crismore 
and Vande Kopple? Should a perceived sense of urgency on the part of policymakers 
inﬂuence a scientist’s decision to accommodate his or her rhetoric? By turning to James 
Hansen’s 1980s testimonials, this article provides scholars with a case study that offers 
answers to these questions. However, before turning to the actual testimonials, a few 
contextual comments about James Hansen and the time period are in order. 
James Hansen and the Scientiﬁc Testimony of the Late 1980s 
James Hansen did not begin his career as someone interested in earthly global warming. 
Instead, his interests were focused more on other planets. A longtime resident of 
Denison, Iowa, Hansen received his Ph.D. from the University of Iowa in 1967. 
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Writing his dissertation on the climate of Venus under the tutelage of the accomplished 
astronomer and physicist James Van Allen, Hansen later accepted a position working 
on NASA’s Venus Project. When he accepted a job at NASA’s Goddard Institute, he 
met Dr. Steven Schneider, who introduced to Hansen the possibility of global climate 
change on Earth. Taking an interest in the subject, Hansen resigned his position on 
the Venus Project to put all his efforts into developing and testing a computer model 
of the Earth’s climate. 
Hansen became one of the ﬁrst scientists to develop an initial computer model 
that linked increasing global warming gases to temperature change. Hansen and others 
noted that the temperature of the Earth would most likely increase approximately 3◦C 
in the twenty-ﬁrst century (Pomerance 1989, 260). However, scientiﬁc acceptance of 
Hansen’s ideas was mixed at the time. This reaction was expected given the number 
of scientists in the 1970s who claimed that the Earth could go into another ice age. 
Hansen knew that few scientists were willing to say the global warming issue was 
settled. However, ice drilling in Greenland and Antarctica during the early 1980s 
further solidiﬁed Hansen’s belief about the threat of global climate change. In the late 
1980s, spurred by extreme weather conditions, Congress invited Hansen to participate 
in a number of hearings aimed at advising lawmakers about future directions for 
environmental policy. 
Hansen participated in three hearings that framed global warming for the general 
public and policymakers. Consistent with standard Senate hearing practices, each day 
of hearings had anywhere from six to twelve witnesses testifying to Senators who were 
entering and leaving the hearings as their schedules dictated. No panel was made up 
of more than six people. Each witness presented a summary of his or her written 
statements that were made accessible to the Senators well before the witnesses actually 
spoke. Before these hearings, few scientists had testiﬁed in Congress on global climate 
change and few policymakers had thought it serious enough to warrant their attention. 
The ﬁrst set of statements and summaries was given before the Senate subcommittee 
on environmental pollution (a subcommittee of the committee on environment and 
public works) on June 10 and 11, 1986. Chaired by Senator John H. Chafee of Rhode 
Island, this hearing was convened to address both ozone and global climate change 
issues (U.S. Congress 1986). The second collection of texts comes from statements 
and summaries given before the Senate committee on energy and natural resources on 
November 9 and 10, 1987. Chaired by Senator Tim E. Wirth of Colorado, this hearing 
was convened largely due to the momentum generated by the ﬁrst hearing, as well 
as scientiﬁc concerns about an increasingly bleak future (U.S. Congress 1987). Once 
again, Hansen was invited to testify; but this time, global climate change was the only 
issue dominating the discussion. The ﬁnal texts consist of the statements and summaries 
given before the Senate committee on energy and natural resources on June 23, 1988. 
Although the hearing was to be chaired by Senator J. Bennett Johnston of Louisiana, 
the duties were yielded to Senator Wirth. Thus, Hansen, along with a few other 
witnesses, was a familiar face to policymakers and activists alike (U.S. Congress 1988). 
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Hansen’s Rhetorical Accommodations 
Studying Hansen’s three testimonies of the late 1980s gives science communication 
scholars an opportunity to observe rhetorical changes made by a scientist speaking to 
policymakers. Hansen’s three testimonies reveal a historically positioned scientist whose 
rhetoric improved as he further understood the complexity of his circumstances. Every 
change Hansen made for his 1988 testimony illustrates his growth as a rhetor cognizant 
of his situation, a rhetor who accommodated his science to his non-scientiﬁc audience. 
Hansen’s accommodations created the conditions necessary for him to gain the support 
of prominent politicians and the attention of inﬂuential journalists. 
In 1986, Hansen’s speech contained few elements of accommodation; instead, 
Hansen’s rhetoric featured commentary on scientiﬁc methodology and the remaining 
uncertainties in climate change science. Hansen began his speech by noting, “In my 
brief summary this morning, I cannot describe the capabilities and limitations of 
climate models in detail. But let me just say a few words about that before turning to 
predictions of where our climate is heading” (U.S. Congress 1986, 18). The two-point 
structure of his speech is clear. However, in both his speech and written statement, the 
primary emphasis was not on his ﬁndings, but on the method he was developing to 
arrive at ﬁndings. 
More important than Hansen’s decision to start with methodological considerations 
was the confusion that ensued due to information overload about his climate models. 
This can be seen in the following exchange between Hansen and Senator Chafee: 
Chafee: Don’t go too fast. Let’s make sure we understand what is what in these. 
What are you showing here? 
Hansen: Let me say, ﬁrst of all, these calculations were carried out by the Climate 
Modeling Group at the Goddard Institute for Space Studies. The model 
simulation begins in 1958, when CO2 began to be measured accurately, 
and the model includes climate forcing due to measured changes in 
CO2, trace gases, and stratospheric aerosols for the period from 1958 
to 1985. 
For the future, we assume two scenarios. In scenario A, we used the 
current growth rates for CO2 and trace gases. In scenario B, we used 
growth rates which drop off rapidly as we go into the future. This map 
shows the global warming in scenario A; that is, for the current growth 
rates of CO2 and trace gases. 
This map shows the global warming trend in the 1990 s as compared 
to 1958. The scale for the warming in most of the United States is 
about 1/2 ◦C to 1◦C, the patched green color. You cannot trust the 
detailed geographical patterns of this predicted warming because of 
natural climate variability. In fact, if you run the model twice, the 
detailed patterns will change from one run to another. But note that 
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there are similar warmings, warmings of similar magnitude, at other 
regions at the same latitude as the United States. 
So the magnitude of the warming is a ﬁrm model prediction, given 
the assumptions that are in the model. A principal assumption is that 
the sensitivity of the climate system is 4◦C for doubled CO2. 
Chafee: Wait; let’s ﬁnish this graph. What is the green? How many degrees in 
change? (Ibid. 19–20) 
Although Hansen was attempting to make his scientiﬁc points about warming, listeners 
had difﬁculty following his explanation. When prompted to not “go too fast,” Hansen 
bolstered his credibility and defended the results through an invocation of authority by 
referencing the Climate Modeling Group at the Goddard Institute for Space Studies. 
However, this did little to explain to Senator Chafee and others what it was they were 
seeing. Hansen’s introduction of commentary about when the data was collected, use 
of technical vocabulary such as “climate forcing” and “trace gas,” uncertainty-creating 
statements such as “you cannot trust the detailed geographical patterns,” and choice to 
put all of this information into conversation with computer modeling efforts, proved 
to be too much for many of the Senators. Hansen’s decision to emphasize how he 
arrived at his conclusions, rather than emphasizing the conclusions ﬁrst, contributed 
to the creation of uncertainty in 1986. 
Hansen also increased the amount of uncertainty surrounding his predictions and 
models in 1986 by placing hedges, qualiﬁcations, and modalities in close proximity to 
the claim he was trying to make: 
But I believe that climate models are good enough now to give us some strong indications 
about the nature of climate changes which will occur because of the increasing CO2 and 
trace gases, although a number of qualiﬁcations and caveats must accompany the results, 
especially for the regional and the local scales, as I discussed in my written testimony. 
(Ibid., 29) 
In this excerpt, the introduction of uncertainty complicates one’s conﬁdence in the 
claim that “models are good enough now” if there are still a number of “qualiﬁcations 
and caveats.” Declarations such as this one put Hansen’s testimony on shaky grounds 
for audience members. If the policymakers sought legislative guidance about the issue 
or wished to inﬂuence public opinion, Hansen was not making this easy for them. 
In his written statement, Hansen highlighted the idea of uncertainty in a variety of 
places. Referring to his climate models, Hansen pointed out that when it came to 
some regional predictions, such as foreseeing patterns of precipitation, the models 
were “not sufﬁciently realistic” (ibid., 81). He also pointed out how representations 
of ocean currents in climate models were “not sufﬁciently realistic to predict such 
phenomenon” (ibid.). Despite Hansen’s conclusion in his 1986 written statement that 
“evidence conﬁrming the essence of the greenhouse theory is already overwhelming,” 
the bulk of his written statement reads more like a technical report designed to inform 
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readers about what a climate model is, how it works, and what its limitations are, rather 
than a statement offering conclusions from the actual use of the model. Hansen appeared 
to be locked into a technical style that privileged what Gross calls the “suite of methods” 
one could use to discover the material truths of the world (Gross 1996, 85). Overall, 
then, Hansen’s speech and written testimony in 1986 featured questions of method as 
much as conclusions and were ﬁlled with uncertainty-producing statements, hedges, 
and modalities. Hansen’s 1986 speech did little to break away from what Fahnestock 
would consider to be a non-accommodated from of scientiﬁc rhetoric. 
Hansen’s 1987 speech contained a number of similarities to the 1986 speech. In 
terms of organization, Hansen’s 1987 speech lacked a preview, but this is not to say 
it was unorganized. Instead, audience members heard a one-sentence thesis: “I will 
summarize the result of numerical simulations of the greenhouse effect, carried out 
with colleagues at the Goddard Institute” (U.S. Congress 1987, 51). Although this 
sentence implies Hansen was going to feature his “result,” this ended up not being the 
case. As with his 1986 statement, Hansen’s 1987 statement more prominently featured 
the methodology and uncertainties rather than his conclusions. 
In 1987, Hansen once again made early and signiﬁcant use of the A and B models 
with no results to show for it. One-third of the way into his speech, Hansen announced 
which model he believed was the most likely scenario: “These scenarios are designed 
speciﬁcally to cover a very broad range of cases. If I were forced to choose one of these 
as most plausible, I would say Scenario B. My guess is that the world is now probably 
following a course that will take it somewhere between A and B” (ibid., 51). Despite 
Hansen’s belief that these models were of the utmost importance, and the obvious 
contradiction between “guessing” B is the right model when the world is not moving 
in that direction, no questions were dedicated to Hansen’s models in the question and 
answer session. Policymakers spent little time trying to decipher the data and models, 
thus missing one of Hansen’s main points: the importance of method. 
Although Hansen did less to note the uncertainties in 1987 than he did in 1986, 
they were still present throughout his discourse. Speaking about the future predictions 
of his models, Hansen noted that “it is difﬁcult to predict reliably how trace gases will 
continue to change” (ibid.). But this begs the question, “If you cannot feed reliable 
variables into your climate models, how can one be sure the models produce reliable 
results?” Hansen’s own observations about the limitations of his models contributed 
to the creation of uncertainties. These statements reveal Hansen’s continued use of 
modalities. By giving guesses and noting difﬁculties, Hansen’s testimony starts to feature 
what Fahnestock, Latour, and Woolgar would call type two statements, statements 
heavily hedged or qualiﬁed to the point of uncertainty. 
In addition to Hansen modifying the strength of his claims, others also contributed 
to the sense of uncertainty. On the second day of speeches, Clarence Brown, Deputy 
Secretary of Commerce, provided testimony that was nothing short of a defense of the 
status quo. He stated, “while experiments project an average global warming due to 
increased carbon dioxide, no direct climate change due to increased carbon dioxide 
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has been conﬁrmed” (U.S. Congress 1987, 160). Brown also referenced the cooling 
in temperature that took place from about 1940 to 1970. William Graham, Deputy 
Administrator at NASA, also contributed to the uncertainty in 1987 in an exchange 
with Senator Stafford: 
Stafford: Now, let me be the devil’s advocate here for just a minute because one 
of the witnesses this morning testiﬁed that between 1940 and 1970 the 
globe was in a cooling trend, and that had to have been during a period 
of very high use of both coal and other fossil fuels, and that from 1970 
to the present there is undoubtedly a warming trend, which may also 
be the result of greenhouse effect. 
My question is: Could some other factor have inﬂuenced the cooling 
trend from 1940 to 1970, and could it have been the Sun, for example, 
or would you have any comment on that? 
Graham: Yes; Senator Stafford. I think this illustrates the fact that we don’t fully 
understand the mechanisms that drive the climate of the Earth or the 
interaction of a number of the phenomena that we observe today on 
the climate and on other parts of the environment. (Ibid., 171) 
What Graham was pointing out when he mentioned “mechanisms that drive the 
climate of the Earth,” were some of the mechanisms Hansen mentioned in 1986, such 
as the role of oceans in the transfer of heat. Similar to the 1986 hearing, the 1987 
hearing produced little attention. 
Both Hansen and Wirth were aware that the earlier hearings had failed to arouse the 
kind of interest and attention that was needed to push global climate change onto the 
front burner of congressional politics. They were also aware that something needed to 
change. In conversations with Wirth, Hansen suggested maximizing the possibility of 
success by timing the speech to coincide with weather conditions that would be more 
amenable to a general audience. Although the 1986 hearing was held in June, a time 
of the year that seemed right for Hansen, the 1987 hearing was held on a rainy day in 
November. According to William K. Stevens, Hansen argued after his 1987 testimony 
that “people would pay attention to global warming only if the hearing were held in 
the summer, when it was hot” (Stevens 1999, 131). The selection of a June hearing was 
not accidental; Hansen was deliberately attempting to create conditions for rhetorical 
success. According to Weart, Wirth agreed to hold the 1988 hearing during June once 
again, despite the summer being “hardly a normal time for politicians who sought 
attention” (Weart 2003, 155). Wirth also aided Hansen in creating better conditions 
for success by altering the order of speakers on the day Hansen was scheduled to testify. 
According to Stevens, “Wirth told Hansen that he was shifting the order of testimony 
so that Hansen could go ﬁrst, in case the television cameras left early” (Stevens 1999, 
132). Hansen’s rhetoric beneﬁted from the favorable conditions leading up to the 1988 
hearing: the summer of 1988 was one of the hottest on record, Wirth changed the order 
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for Hansen to be featured ﬁrst, and, most importantly, Hansen ﬁnally accommodated 
his rhetoric to his audience. 
In 1988, Hansen used a very concise style and organization. Consistent with what 
Fahnestock has noted about accommodated science, Hansen began with his conclusions 
instead of methodological concerns. After thanking the Chairman for allowing him to 
testify, Hansen then immediately said the following: 
I would like to draw three main conclusions. Number one, the earth is warmer in 1988 
than at any time in the history of instrumental measurements. Number two, the global 
warming is now large enough that we can ascribe with a high degree of conﬁdence a 
cause and effect relationship to the greenhouse effect. And number three, our computer 
climate simulations indicate that the greenhouse [e]ffect is already large enough to begin 
to effect the probability of extreme events such as summer heat waves. (U.S. Congress 
1988, 39) 
Similarly, in the second paragraph of his written, prepared statement that was circulated 
to the Senators, Hansen wrote: 
My principal conclusions are: (1) the earth is warmer in 1988 than at any other time 
in the history of instrumental measurements, (2) the global warming is now sufﬁciently 
large that we can ascribe with a high degree of conﬁdence a cause and effect relationship 
to the greenhouse effect, and (3) in our computer climate simulations the greenhouse 
effect now is already large enough to begin to affect the probability of occurrence of 
extreme weather events such as summer heat waves; the model results imply that heat 
wave/drought occurrences in the Southeast and Midwest United States may be more 
frequent in the next decade than in climatological (1950–1980) statistics. (Ibid., 43) 
Comparing these two excerpts illustrates Hansen’s dedication to having his spoken 
testimony remain consistent with his written statement. In addition, Hansen’s mention 
of “extreme weather events such as summer heat waves” while the summer of 1988 
burned its way into American memory was not coincidental. He adapted his rhetoric 
to those conditions without making the unscientiﬁc claim (at the time) that 1988 was 
causally related to global climate change. Hansen also shows signs of being a seasoned 
public speaker through his decision to omit extraneous details related to his claim. 
Although his written testimony provides more details, such as speciﬁc regions of the 
nation (the Southeast and Midwest) that were breaking temperature records, Hansen 
chose to leave this information out of his speech. The end result was that the claims 
were easier for audiences to digest. 
In 1988, Hansen again mentioned computer models, but his discussion created less 
confusion than in 1986. This was, in part, due to the clear and unambiguous statements 
Hansen made about his level of certainty in the scenarios. But more importantly, 
Hansen related what he was showing on his viewgraphs to real world conditions for 
the ﬁrst time in the three years. For example: 
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My ﬁrst viewgraph . . .  shows the global temperature over the period of instrumental 
records which is about 100 years. The present temperature is the highest in the period 
of record. The rate of warming in the past 25 years, as you can see on the right, is the 
highest on record. The four warmest years, as the Senator mentioned, have all been in 
the 1980 s. And 1988 so far is so much warmer than 1987, that barring a remarkable and 
improbable cooling, 1988 will be the warmest year on record. (Ibid., 39) 
For the lay listeners at the hearings, Hansen’s presentation was much clearer in 1988 than 
in 1986 or 1987. The inclusion of weather conditions that policymakers were living 
through made the presentation of temperature charts and computer simulations more 
palatable, while starting with his conclusions made his testimony easier to understand. 
If the message Hansen was delivering in the early years was perceived as muddled and 
confused, his 1988 testimony seemed crystal clear. 
The level of uncertainty found in Hansen’s 1988 testimony also differed signiﬁcantly 
from earlier years. Although Hansen still wanted to understand some of the processes 
that were unclear to him, he only dedicated one sentence to that issue in his 1988 
speech: “Finally, I would like to stress that there is a need for improving these global 
climate models, and there is a need for global observations if we’re going to obtain a full 
understanding of these phenomena” (ibid., 41). This sentence’s placement at the end 
of Hansen’s testimony gives it the appearance of being more of an afterthought than 
an important point in his presentation. In addition, the language itself makes it seem as 
though the additional improvements he is referring to are part of a natural progression 
associated with scientiﬁc work rather than limitations associated with the current state 
of knowledge. In his written testimony, the idea of uncertainty comes up in a few 
additional instances, but it is not enough to detract from the weight of his argument. 
For example, Hansen noted that there were “major uncertainties” in his climate models 
due to “global climate sensitivity” and “heat uptake and transport by the ocean,” but 
he concludes this section of his written statement with an overwhelmingly certain 
declaration: “Global warming has reached a level such that we can ascribe with a high 
degree of conﬁdence a cause and effect relationship between the greenhouse effect and 
the observed warming” (ibid., 44). The notion of uncertainty is present in Hansen’s 
1988 testimony, but is signiﬁcantly downplayed. Add to this Hansen’s continuous use of 
clear and certain language throughout his presentation, and an audience is much more 
likely to see Hansen’s request for additional research as an attempt to further reﬁne an 
already decided matter. Hansen’s comments about the “clear signs of the greenhouse 
effect,” the “clear tendencies” in the data, the observation of a “very strong case,” as 
well as changes “large enough to be noticeable to the average person” minimize any 
uncertainty creation the last sentence of his presentation may have displayed (ibid., 
40–41). 
When examining Hansen’s 1986, 1987, and 1988 speeches and written statements, 
deﬁnite signs of rhetorical accommodations emerge from his 1988 rhetoric, 
accommodations attributable to Hansen’s growth as a rhetor responding to his given 
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constraints. First, Hansen, aided by Wirth, attempted to create the conditions that 
would improve his chances of success. Second, Hansen did more to emphasize his 
conclusions rather than his method. Third, Hansen reduced the number of hedges, 
qualiﬁcations, and modalities that would have created a sense of uncertainty. The 
rhetoric of the late 1980 s indicates Hansen was a rhetor who came to terms with his 
situation: Hansen became a better rhetor as he learned from his previous experiences 
and accommodated his rhetoric accordingly. 
Conclusion 
This article has explored why Hansen is recognized as a key scientist in the global 
climate change debates of the late 1980s: his rhetoric of accommodated science was 
positioned in a favorable environmental and rhetorical situation. In the end, can 
Hansen’s testimony be said to be the only reason for the increase in policymakers’ 
concerns or the increased media coverage of environmental issues? No. Weather 
conditions, political interests, and other external circumstances certainly contributed to 
Hansen’s success and constrained his available rhetorical options. However, the success 
of Hansen and his rhetorical choices are difﬁcult to deny. A search of the Lexis-Nexis 
database for news stories that mention Hansen adds support to this claim. Before 1988, 
Hansen’s speeches about climate change were virtually ignored. The Washington Post 
published one article on his 1986 testimony and was silent in 1987 (Peterson 1986). 
The New York Times published one article on a speech Hansen delivered in 1982, but 
nothing for his 1986 or 1987 testimonials (Anon. 1982). But 1988 was signiﬁcantly 
different. The Washington Post quoted directly from Hansen’s testimony that, “The 
greenhouse effect has been detected and it is changing our climate now” (Weisskopf 
1988, A4.) The New York Times not only featured Hansen in a front page article, 
quoting from his speech multiple times, but it also featured a line from him in the 
“Quotation of the Day” section of the paper (Shabecoff 1988a). Articles referencing 
Hansen’s speech also appeared in August and December, months after he had delivered 
it (Wilford 1988; Shabecoff 1988b). Even international newspapers, such as London’s 
The Times, featured stories on his testimony (Binton 1988). Furthermore, attention 
to Hansen’s speech was not isolated to newspapers. According to Stephen Schneider, 
Hansen’s claims amassed an impressive amount of press coverage across a variety of 
media outlets: “Jim appeared on a dozen or more national television programs, was 
quoted in a front-page story in the New York Times, and even showed up on David 
Brinkley’s Sunday television program sporting a large pair of dice on which he painted 
some faces to represent more warm years” (Schneider 1990, 195). Through a number 
of rhetorical adjustments in a fortunate set of circumstances, Hansen managed to use his 
testimony to thrust global climate change issues into the public spotlight. Initially, my 
analysis has illustrated one way scientists can, and do, develop a rhetorical sensitivity in 
light of their rhetorically constrained situations. James Hansen did not simply get lucky 
James Hansen and Global Warming 151 
in 1988; he accommodated his rhetoric to maximize its effectiveness by emphasizing 
conclusions rather than method and by reducing the use of qualiﬁcations, hedges, and 
modalities. 
My analysis also contributes to our understanding of accommodated rhetoric in 
deliberative settings. As Hansen encountered a change in genre from the forensic 
to the deliberative, his rhetoric was accommodated in such a way that hedges and 
modalities were downplayed in favor of featuring his ﬁndings. This case study offers 
one example of how accommodated science rhetoric functions in the deliberative 
sphere of politics, an area Fahnestock noticeably omitted in her classic treatment of 
the subject. This essay also suggests accommodated rhetoric functions effectively in 
situations where policymakers are faced with a sense of urgency. However, scientists 
who choose to accommodate their rhetoric to non-scientist audiences should be 
cautious when speaking to policymakers in similar situations. As questions of method 
are replaced with claims of certainty, scientists run the risk of overstepping their bounds 
of expertise as they are asked to move from being technical advisors to being legislative 
authors. Hansen encountered this very issue. When Senator Chafee asked Hansen 
what he would do about the global warming problem if he were made king, Hansen 
answered, “I am sorry if I sound more like a befuddled scientist rather than a king, but I 
would like to understand the problem better before I order any dramatic actions” (U.S. 
Congress 1986, 29). Hansen’s response was simply to maintain his scientist persona, a 
refusal to step outside of the very persona that generated his credibility to begin with. 
Crafting his testimonies in the late 1980s was certainly no simple charge; but, 
Hansen has shown he was up to the task and that this kind of communication could 
be accomplished with success. Troubled by skeptics who revisit his 1988 claims in 
order to shed doubt on the realities of global climate change, James Hansen posted a 
short commentary on the Goddard Institute for Space Studies’ website. Reﬂecting on 
his experiences as a scientist who often communicates with non-scientist audiences, 
he said: “But one quickly learns that such communication is not easy, at least not for 
many of us” (Hansen 1999). Indeed, a great deal is left to be understood about scientiﬁc 
accommodations in deliberative settings before they can be classiﬁed as comfortable 
rhetorical practices. 
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